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ABSTRACT 
 
This work can be regarded as an outline of behavior (human nature) from our 
greatest descriptive psychologist. In considering these matters we must keep 
in mind that philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought 
(DPHOT), which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked –
i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated anywhere. Sadly, Wittgenstein's brilliant 
exposition of behavior is still understood well by only a handful. 
 
Much of the work is aimed at undermining the idea of introspection and 
private language via clever examples and of course there is a mountain of 
literature on this topic since but neither W nor anyone else ever makes it clear 
that the basic argument is trivial—if you don’t have a test that distinguishes 
between two words they cannot have a role in language and there cannot be 
any such test for private mental phenomena. In between he is describing how 
System 1 (the automatic functions of the brain) is described by intransitive uses 
of verbs such as seeing, remembering (i.e., they are Causally Self Reflexive) and 
differs from and blends into System 2- the deliberative linguistic system (e.g. 
p101, 161, 166 etc.). He spends much time showing that disposition words (S2) 
such as thinking, meaning, judging, interpreting, knowing, understanding, 
believing, intending, reading, calculating, recognizing, comparing, deciding, 
counting, imaging etc. are not mental states with a precise duration but that 
their use depends on their having a clear public outcome-i.e., being transitive 
verbs (i.e., having Conditions of Satisfaction, which is the phrase Searle 
invented decades later). They are abilities to act. 
 
I suggest that with the perspective I propose, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is 
to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
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Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my 
writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, 
Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd 
ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, 
in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set 
theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual 
confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means 
of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.” (BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
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"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not a 
defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no 
real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
 
“There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and finds) 
what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as from a 
reservoir.” BBB p143 
 
“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to 
make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It is no 
act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea that 
“something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the confusion 
between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The chain 
of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and 
reality loses all point. For now the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The 
sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it 
represents.” BBB p37 
 
“Thus we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are obviously 
not aware of the many different usages of the word “proof; and that they are not 
clear about the differences between the uses of the word “kind”, when they talk of 
kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the word “kind” here meant the same 
thing as in the context “kinds of apples.” Or, we may say, they are not aware of the 
different meanings of the word “discovery” when in one case we talk of the 
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discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the other case of the discovery 
of the South Pole.” BBB p29 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach 
of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... 
Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously 
experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC 
p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an 
intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality 
is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously 
suppose that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the 
notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological 
notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way 
that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of 
social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 
32 
 
“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.”  TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the 
problems of life remain completely untouched.  Of course, there are then no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer.”  TLP 6.52 
 
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
5 
 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts.” Z 220 
 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions.” PI 126 
 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, 
not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107 
 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the following, 
that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The truth of the 
matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have got it actually 
present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in the realm of the 
grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is already there. Thus, we 
have already got everything and need not wait for the future.” (said in 1930) 
Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979) p183 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. ---Not anything that 
follows from this, no this itself is the solution! ….This is connected, I believe, with 
our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a 
description, if we give it the right place in our considerations.  If we dwell upon it, 
and do not try to get beyond it.” Zettel p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) 
are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest descriptive 
psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind that philosophy 
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is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (DPHOT), which is another 
of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked –i.e., I have never seen it clearly 
stated anywhere. 
The book originates in two sets of notes taken at his lectures between 1933 and 1935 
which were circulated as mimeographed copies. Those from 1933–4 were bound in 
blue while those from 1934–5 were bound in brown and they were published in 
1958 as ‘Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations’. 
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: “Wittgenstein 
resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our subject for centuries, 
sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems about the nature of 
linguistic representation, about the relationship between thought and language, 
about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and 
about the nature of necessary truth and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed 
up the soil of European philosophy of logic and language. He gave us a novel and 
immensely fruitful array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted 
to overturn centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical 
truth. He undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a 
vision of philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human 
understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of the conceptual 
confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--'Gordon Baker's late 
interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
 
I would add that W was the first (by 40 years) to clearly and extensively describe 
the two systems of thought -- fast automatic pre-linguistic S1 and the slow reflective 
linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is possible with a vast 
inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be doubted 
or judged, so will (choice), consciousness, self, time and space are innate true-only 
axioms. He discussed many times what is now known as Theory of Mind, Framing 
and cognitive illusions. He frequently explained the necessity of the innate 
background and demonstrated how it generates behavior. He described the 
psychology behind what later became the Wason test--a fundamental measure used 
in EP research decades later. He noted the indeterminate nature of language and 
the game-like nature of social interaction. He examined in thousands of pages and 
hundreds of examples how our inner mental experiences are not describable in 
language, this being possible only for public behavior with a public language (the 
impossibility of private language). Thus, he can be viewed as the first evolutionary 
psychologist. 
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He patented helicopter designs which anticipated by three decades the use of blade-
tip jets to drive the rotors, and which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow gas 
turbine engine, designed a heart-beat monitor, designed and supervised the 
building of a modernist house, and sketched a proof of Euler's Theorem, 
subsequently completed by others. 
 
He described and refuted the notions of the mind as machine and the computational 
theory of mind, long before practical computers. He invented truth tables and 
predicted paraconsistent logic. He decisively laid to rest skepticism and 
metaphysics. He showed that, far from being inscrutable, the activities of the mind 
lie open before us, a lesson few have learned since. 
 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like 
him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not 
offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of intuitive 
psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching ideas about the 
nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part of the world and like 
Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual 
recluse with a difficult personality who published only one early version of his 
ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but became world famous; completely 
changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing more, and knowledge 
of his new work, in mostly garbled form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures 
and students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly 
handwritten scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs 
with, often, no clear relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut and 
pasted from other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, 
underlinings and crossed out words, so that many sentences have multiple variants; 
that his literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what 
they wished and struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct 
meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how the 
universe works and that they then published this material with agonizing slowness 
(not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no real explanation 
of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as famous due to many 
statements that all previous physics was a mistake and even nonsense, and that 
virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of 
thousands of papers discussing it; that many physicists knew only his early work 
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in which he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in such 
extremely abstract and condensed form that it was difficult to decide what was 
being said; that he was then virtually forgotten and that most books and articles on 
the nature of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics had only passing 
and usually erroneous references to him, and that many omitted him entirely; that 
to this day, over half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people 
who really grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I 
claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Before remarking on “The Blue and Brown Books”, I will first offer some comments 
on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as 
exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will 
help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making 
the Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide 
a clear description of higher order behavior not found in psychology books, that I 
will refer to as the WS framework. To serve as an heuristic, I have generated a table 
of INTENTIONALITY based on a much simpler one from S and which owes much to 
W, but no space here so please see it in some other reviews such as that of 
Shoemaker’s ‘Physical Realization’. It should prove stimulating to compare this 
table with the various charts in Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking 
--e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the extensions of S2 
into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 
social behavior, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of 
S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, prelinguistic mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 -
-Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can 
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be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are 
expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing 
neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and 
Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only 
be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 
2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, 
S, Hacker etc.). 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use 
(but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self Reflexive 
(CSR)-called reflexive or intransitive in BBB), and the S2 use, which is their normal 
use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I 
know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not 
CSR (called transitive in BBB). 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing 
the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal 
development into a wide array of automatic cultural deontic relationships (S3). I 
expect this fairly well describes the basic structure of behavior. 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of 
perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear 
numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-
only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often 
modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that 
often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The 
general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion 
(called by Searle `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and 
by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has 
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generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in 
control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that 
this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public 
truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: "When I think in language, there 
aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the 
thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). 
Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment 
meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and 
reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might note here 
that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent 
warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a 
characterization of higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can 
find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes 
that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... 
is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which 
means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing COS in a context that 
can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental state. 
 
Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would not 
have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments 
that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what 
gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. 
Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that 
without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should 
happen"..." the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled 
cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean 
that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been 
satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have 
learned to talk, then I do know." 
 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. He 
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shows that behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms (see “On Certainty” 
for his final extended treatment of this idea) and that our conscious ratiocination 
emerges from unconscious machinations. His corpus can be seen as the foundation 
for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed 
must work. The “must” is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common 
ancestry and common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, that this 
necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the same 
evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is extended 
into a personality based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to 
manipulate others. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider W’s work 
and most of his examples as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking 
(e.g., perceptions vs dispositions-- see below), but nature and nurture. 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—the Top 
Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of examples of 
language use in context, exposing the many varieties of language games and the 
relationships between the primary games of true-only unconscious, axiomatic fast 
thinking of perception, memory and reflexive emotions and acts (often described as 
the subcortical and primitive cortical reptilian brain first-self functions), and the 
later evolved higher cortical dispositional conscious abilities of believing, knowing, 
thinking etc. that constitute the true or false propositional secondary language 
games of slow thinking that include the network of cognitive illusions that 
constitute the basis of our second-self personality. He dissects hundreds of 
language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive 
actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and 
understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples also 
address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his 
later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current 
and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that 
this evolutionary two systems view is the best. To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s 
famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the light of 
evolutionary psychology.” 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of Thought: 
language as a window into human nature”) that language is a window on or some 
sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that there must be some other 
“Language of Thought” of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried 
to show, with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicacious examples of 
language in action, that language is not just the best picture we can ever get of 
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thinking, the mind and human nature, but speech is the mind, and his whole corpus 
can be regarded as the development of this idea. He rejected the idea that the 
Bottom Up approaches of physiology, experimental psychology and computation 
(Computational Theory of Mind, Strong AI, Dynamic Systems Theory, 
functionalism, etc.) could reveal what his analyses of Language Games (LG’s) did. 
The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes and 
to capture vagueness (“The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way 
of representing vagueness” LWPP1, 347). And so, speech is the mind, which is 
expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech 
using the later evolved Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) of the Second Self--the 
dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). As with his 
other aphorisms I suggest one should take seriously his comment that even if God 
could look into our mind he could not see what we are thinking—this should be the 
motto of the Embodied Mind. 
 
He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that 
the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front 
of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon the myth of 
introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting to 
observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). 
 
Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology is 
essential to understanding W and human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody else, 
points out). 
 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP 
and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the 
consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A corollary, 
nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is 
that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other 
nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as “reality” is the 
result of involuntary axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
 
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout 
his work, and almost exclusively in OC (his last work), are equivalent to the fast 
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thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--
“Thinking Fast and Slow”, but nobody notices that W laid out the framework some 
75 years ago), which is involuntary and unconscious and which corresponds to the 
mental states of perception (including UA1) and memory and reflexive acts, as W 
notes in many examples.  One might call these “intracerebral reflexes” (maybe 99% 
of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like 
“cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of course 
these too are language games, so there will be more and less useful ways to use 
these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever of 
slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or 
intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network of 
“cognitive modules”, “inference engines”,“intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, 
“cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
 
One of W’s recurring themes was TOM, or as I prefer UA. Ian Apperly, who is 
carefully analyzing UA1 and UA2 in experiments, has recently become aware of 
Hutto, who has characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor representation 
involved in UA1--that being reserved for UA2—see my review of his book with 
Myin). However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the 
groundwork for this 80 years ago. 
 
It is an easily defensible view that the core of the burgeoning literature on cognitive 
illusions, automatisms and higher order thought is compatible with and 
straightforwardly deducible from W. 
 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and 
even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything 
approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts and commonly 
there is barely a mention. 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table 
of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over the last 
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few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much 
to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by 
current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes which are evidenced in 
the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 
3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing 
behavior that I find more complete and useful than any other framework I have 
seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three 
dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, 
between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W 
demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly 
different uses (meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by 
scientists but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as 
opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful 
in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), 
the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality 
(LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical 
philosophical term. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions 
etc. 
**          Searle’s Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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I give detailed explanations of this table in my other writings.  
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and 
each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination of 
context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which 
provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this one. 
 
Now for some comments on “The Blue and Brown Books” (BBB). 
 
These two volumes were dictated to his students during 1933-35 and were 
mimeographed and circulated until their publication in book form in 1958. 
Although very few understood much of what W was saying, his ideas began 
appearing in distorted and watered down versions, often without ascription or even 
knowledge of their origin (i.e., the same as today).   These volumes are unique in 
being almost continuous essay type prose, unlike nearly all of the other 20,000 pages 
in his nachlass, which seem to be disjointed notes in telegraphic style, having little 
connection with one another.  Partly this is due to the fact that most of them received 
little or no editing, with much crossing out, marginal notation and multiple versions 
all jumbled together in their original German, with numerous infelicitous 
translations into English.  The BBB show us his power and beauty in original 
English and is the only extended account he ever gave of his view of the nature of 
and solution to philosophical problems, via the clear description of higher order 
thought, as revealed in our language, which is its only possible expression. 
 
After the above and my many reviews of books by and about W, S, H etc., it should 
be clear what W is doing here (and everywhere) so I’ll make just a few comments. 
 
Much of the work is aimed at undermining the idea of introspection and private 
language via clever examples and of course there is a mountain of literature on this 
topic since but afaik neither W nor anyone else ever makes it clear that the basic 
argument is trivial—if you don’t have a test that distinguishes between two words 
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they cannot have a role in language and there cannot be any such test for private 
mental phenomena. In between he is describing how S1 is described by intransitive 
uses of verbs such as seeing, remembering (i.e., they are CSR) and differs from and 
blends into S2 (e.g. p101, 161, 166 etc.). He spends much time showing that 
disposition words (S2) such as thinking, meaning, judging, interpreting, knowing, 
understanding, believing, intending, reading, calculating, recognizing, comparing, 
deciding, counting, imaging etc. are not mental states with a precise duration but 
that their use depends on their having a clear public outcome-i.e., being transitive 
verbs (i.e., having COS which is the phrase Searle invented decades later). They are 
abilities to act. 
 
On p6 (cf. p18) is one of the most revolutionary statements in the history of 
philosophy and psychology--"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are 
concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." This is probably 
his earliest clear statement of the futility of science envy. Sadly, few have 
understood his rejection of Descartes and duality, and afaik none of the leading 
lights of contemporary cognitive science are among them. 
 
On p9 he discusses the diviner who “feels” the water, raising both the private 
language issue and the correct description of “feeling”, followed by “imagining” on 
p12, both being dispositions which can only function via their COS and not by 
introspection of “mental images”. Incisive comments on the differences between 
“cause” and “reason” follow on p15 and here as everywhere in W one can consult 
the many books of Hacker et al for exegesis. 
 
On p18 he returns to science envy and makes another seeming trivial but profound 
comment—on our contempt for the particular case. Why indeed should the 
commonality between finite and transfinite numbers impress us more than their 
differences—which, like any of his examples, can take us deep into psychology, 
philosophy, language, and math. 
 
Pain sensations (p24) constitute one of his favorite examples of how language (an 
S2 function expressed by oral and finger muscles) originates in the spontaneous pre-
linguistic S1 functions. 
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And please don’t miss the brilliant discussion of the dispositions of wishing, 
imagining, knowing, etc. on p37 et seq., and above all p42, where he once again kills 
the idea that they are mental states (and the notion that he is a behaviorist), which 
all students of behavior should be required to memorize. 
 
The Brown Book is again principally aimed at exorcising the idea of mental states 
from the dispositions while comparing S2 and S1. It may seem that W spends far 
too much time on this but it is at the core of all the confusion about mind/body 
duality (Descarte’s error). It may help to reflect on two comments in the BB p72, 
p74. “The Kernel of our proposition that that which has pains or sees or thinks is of 
a mental nature is only, that the word “I” in “I have pains” does not denote a 
particular body, for we can’t substitute for “I” a description of a body.” “The 
philosopher who thinks it makes sense to say to himself “I am here” takes the verbal 
expression from the sentence in which “here” is a place in common space and thinks 
of “here” as the here in visual space. He therefore really says something like “Here 
is here”. 
 
On p90 he begins on the LG’s of math which were to blossom forth soon after into 
many remarks that later were later published in Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics and Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. The nature of the 
confusions in math and logic are shown to be the same as in language, which should 
not be surprising. 
 
For discussions of W’s analysis of reading (p118 et seq.) see e.g., Hacker’s books and 
Harre and Tissaw’s WAP. On p127 he returns to the dissection of dispositions like 
recognizing, seeing as, knowing etc. and of rule following. Since S1 provides the 
fuel for S2, they normally merge instantly but have different functions and language 
to describe them. W discusses many times the nature of the perception “seeing” vs 
that of the disposition of “seeing as”. I think very few have realized that rule 
following, reading, seeing, meaning, proving, experiencing, intending, knowing 
etc., are also essentially dispositional in nature. 
P143 is another one to memorize—oceans of confusion dispelled by a few drops of 
wisdom. Likewise, the discussion on p161-2 of reflexive verbs- i.e., the CSR 
intransitive nature of S1 vs the transitive COS of S2. On 161 and 175 he foreshadows 
his later development of the axiomatic true only nature of our mind (our language) 
that was to reach its climax in his last work On Certainty-- in my view his most 
important and least appreciated work and the foundation stone of all study of 
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behavior. 
Note that in 2019 a new version of the brown book dictate by W to Francis Skinner 
will appear from Springer and early lecture notes take by Yorick Smithies have 
recently been published.  Also the whole nachlass is now online in several places 
and a new version of the Bergen CD will appear ca 2021.  
http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf. And of course most 
academic articles and books are now free online on b-ok.org and libgen.io. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, and that to miss him is to 
miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
 
 
